1 (October 7th, 2013, Judge Karalunas, continuation of Small 2 Smiles trial) 3 THE COURT: You guys should know I don't have 4 any guilt about not having my jury charges done. 5 getting all these changes and new stuff. I do have the 6 verdict sheet done, and so I'm going to hand that out 7 right now. 8 9 This does not include the changes that are --10 Mr. Leyendecker, I think it was you, that submitted the 11 change to the G.B.L. This was based on the G.B.L. as I had drafted it. 12 13 Mr. LEYENDECKER: Okay. THE COURT: If everybody would just take a 14 15 minute to look through that... 16 Some of the instructions are a 17 THE COURT: 18 little confusing. 19 Mr. Hackerman, while they're looking at those, 20 why don't you come on up here? Does anybody mind? 21 not going to talk about the case. 22 23 Mr. LEYENDECKER: On the first run-through, it 24 looks pretty solid. I haven't had a chance to tie back on

your damage questions, your Honor, limit to 2(a), 7(a), et

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cetera; I have not had a chance to check that detail, and then --

THE COURT: I did have time to check that, and my guess is it's right, so... obviously if anybody catches anything like that, let me know by e-mail, copies to everybody.

Mr. LEYENDECKER: And the other thing on this, your Honor, on the definition of the Syracuse clinic, we have the three dentists listed and there was an issue about the vicarious liability -- I think we're going to perhaps bring it to a head.

THE COURT: Right. We're going to talk about that, so that definition might change is what you're saying?

Mr. LEYENDECKER: Yes.

Mr. HIGGINS: Just while people are looking through that, I just wanted to try to save some time and there was -- I went back and looked through the openings and there were very discrete issues that might cause us to object on the closings tomorrow so I prepared a page-and-a-half submission on that, which is double-spaced, and I served that on all counsel by LexisNexis and gave them another hard copy when they came in today.

So I can put those on the record in about a

1 minute-and-a-half or I have a written submission I can 2 give to the Court. 3 THE COURT: So these are issues that you're concerned the defendants might raise during closing 4 5 argument that you want a ruling on --Mr. HIGGINS: Yes. 6 7 THE COURT: -- in advance of? Mr. HIGGINS: Yes. 8 THE COURT: Why don't you just hand it up to me 9 10 and I'll take a look at it. 11 Mr. HIGGINS: Okay. 12 And just another housekeeping matter is in terms 13 of after the closings, usually the attorneys go through the exhibits and they make sure that all the exhibits 14 going back are appropriate and things of that nature. 15 16 There's a lot of exhibits here and I was trying to think 17 how that was going to work and I just wasn't sure how, you 18 know, if there's any redactions or anything like that. 19 That's just something that sometimes takes time. 2.0 THE COURT: Right. The Exhibits are here and I 21 do not send exhibits back to the jury unless they request 22 them. 23 Mr. HIGGINS: Okay. 24 THE COURT: But, you know, if they request the

exhibits, I'm going to send them back, and so if there are

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redactions that need to be made, my suggestion is that if all counsel agree, the exhibits can be removed from court to have -- because I'm not going to be able to let people stay here after 4:30 to do any necessary redactions, but that's your call.

Mr. HIGGINS: I don't have any specific, but I'm just saying it can take some time. If they're not all going back at once, that's helpful.

THE COURT: But for example, if they ask for an exhibit, I'm not going to wait, you know, while you're going through a stack of the exhibit to redact.

Mr. FRANKEL: Is there an official exhibit list that says "here's what's in evidence"? We have our own, but --

THE COURT: Well, for some reason, I don't have a court clerk or court security here today. I'm guessing that word didn't get out. But there should be a list, yes. The court clerk normally has that.

Mr. STEVENS: I appreciate the fact that my colleague, Mr. Higgins, who used to be with my firm, by the way, wants to save time by bringing up the issue of what can and can't be said at summations and we of course have the same concern, hoping to save time, but we just —the kind of phrases here, I think this debate is one we should try to work out among ourselves and if there's any

issues left standing, we'll bring them up to the Court briefly tomorrow.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me just say, though, again, I mean I don't mean to beat a dead horse, but I am just one person and I don't know when I'm going to -- if you bring them up tomorrow morning and the jury is here at 8:45, ready to go, when am I supposed to -- when are you going to bring those up to me?

Mr. STEVENS: We're a little blind-sided by this right now, but also, to object to charges, will we see them before the summations?

THE COURT: I'm not sure. I would hope so because I'm going to have to be able to read them right after your summations. Whether I'm going to get them done tonight or whether I'm going to get them done in the morning, I really can't tell you.

And again, I'm not feeling that sympathetic because we spent a long time yesterday working on this, you know, and I'm still getting new stuff as we go. I'm doing my best.

Mr. STEVENS: All you can do is your best, but before summations are given, we do make that request.

THE COURT: I hear what you're saying. As I said to you yesterday, objections are probably going to be reserved, until the jury goes back, to anything that I

1	charge, simply because I'm going to go over with you					
2	generally what I'm charging right now, but I won't have a					
3	form of my written charge so you'll know generally what					
4	I'm charging tomorrow.					
5	Mr. FIRST: Judge, on the jury verdict form,					
6	when do you want objections on the record to be made? Do					
7	you want them now or do you want					
8	THE COURT: We dealt with all these issues					
9	yesterday, so if there's something specific you want, tel					
10	me right now.					
11	Mr. FIRST: It's a lot of things, but all the					
12	things we talked about last night. That's what I'm					
13	talking about. I need to make a record of it					
14	THE COURT: We'll do that. When we send it back					
15	to the jury, then we'll put those objections on the					
16	record.					
17	Mr. LEYENDECKER: One question on Question 13,					
18	your Honor, the battery.					
19	THE COURT: Yes.					
20	Mr. LEYENDECKER: We had I'm not trying to					
21	but all three dates					
22	THE COURT: October 26th. I thought I had a					
23	note to take out the 26th.					
24	Mr. LEYENDECKER: There's not a restraint on the					
25	26th but it does fall in line with our allegation that					

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they concealed the existence of the scheme to treat for purposes of revenue rather than dental needs, that that was concealed, but for this concealment of information, he would not be sent for treatment, so there was an allegation as to all three Bonds' treatments. I don't know whether your Honor has concluded it relates only to the two restraint episodes and if so, I accept that because --

THE COURT: No, I took that out because I had a "no" next to my notes and I thought it was because there wasn't a restraint issue, but I also agree that it is not an appropriate --

Mr. LEYENDECKER: Okay.

THE COURT: -- charge with respect to the October 26th on the basis that you have just alleged, so I'm not going to add that in there.

Mr. STEVENS: We're talking about --

THE COURT: The battery.

Mr. STEVENS: Could we talk about the Syracuse clinic because my individual defendants are double-named throughout the verdict sheet when it lists their names individually and then under their names, Syracuse clinic. So the jury could find in favor of one of my dentists and then mistakenly find against them just by naming the Syracuse clinic. That would be confusing, and I'm sure

it's not what the Court intends.

THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. HIGGINS: For the record, the Court did meet with all counsel yesterday for I think four-and-a-half hours on Sunday at the Crown Plaza Hotel, and I know all counsel want to express our appreciation to the Court for that.

This was discussed during that time and we're now moving for a directed verdict on the issue of vicarious liability as to the three dentists, Bonds, Aman and Khan as to the Syracuse clinic, and I think that would resolve, I think, the issue that Mr. Stevens is concerned about.

THE COURT: So when you say you're moving for a directed verdict on the issue of vicarious liability, is there any -- just so I'm clear, you're not asking the Court to find liability but merely to, in essence, obtain from defendants a stipulation that if there is a verdict against the individual defendants that the clinic is liable -- I'm not sure I understand what you're saying.

Mr. HIGGINS: Well, I think on the proof there is -- I think we're -- we talked about getting a stipulation from New FORBA, so we should probably start with that. If we have a stipulation, there's no reason for a directed verdict. But if Drs. Bonds, Aman and Khan

1 are found legally liable in malpractice or some claim --THE COURT: So malpractice or other claims? 2 3 Mr. HIGGINS: Yes, and then we're looking for a stipulation from New counsel that the Syracuse clinic is 4 vicariously liable for that exposure. 5 Mr. CAHALAN: Your Honor, we would stipulate 6 7 that the clinic would be vicariously liable for the acts of its employees within the scope of their employment. We 8 do not obviously admit liability, but we admit the legal 9 10 concept and that they were employees. 11 Mr. LEYENDECKER: Can I just ask, are you 12 acknowledging to the Court that you're not going to take a 13 position that something they did in treating Jeremy was 14 beyond the scope of their employment? 15 THE COURT: By the caveat you put on at the end 16 of the sentence? 17 Mr. CAHALAN: Yes, that's the definition. 18 don't think there is any allegation that anything occurred 19 outside of the scope of their employment. 2.0 Mr. LEYENDECKER: Do you want to take off your 21 qualification then because you need to do one or the 22 other? 23 Mr. CAHALAN: We will withdraw the 24 qualification. I think it goes to what we may be looking 25 at is if they exceeded the scope of their employment.

1 don't think they're making an allegation in that regard, 2 and so we would withdraw the qualification. 3 THE COURT: Okay. That was one of the issues I was going to have to deal with, so in terms of the verdict 4 sheet then, we're going to take out --5 Mr. LEYENDECKER: The end of the Syracuse 6 7 definition, just take out the --THE COURT: And also. 8 9 Mr. LEYENDECKER: Yes, and also through, "as 10 includes dentists "through the names ending in Khan, D.D.S., period. 11 12 Mr. STEVENS: Your Honor --13 Mr. LEYENDECKER: I just need to clarify on this 14 stipulation. I just want to make sure it's the Syracuse 15 clinic that's stipulating to vicarious liability as 16 related to the dentists as opposed to New FORBA. Mr. CAHALAN: It's not New FORBA, but I need 17 18 clarification because there's a cause, intentional tort 19 alleged as respects the battery and that would be 20 exceeding the scope of employment, so I think --21 THE COURT: No, I think under P.J.I. 2:237, an 22 employer can be liable for even the reckless or 23 intentional acts of an employee. That's the jury charge 24 that you guys asked for, too. 25 Mr. CAHALAN: Well, okay --

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THE COURT: I guess I was going to ask the question whether I'm even going to charge that in light of the stipulation here. Do we even charge vicarious liability at all, either 2:235 or 2:237?

Mr. LEYENDECKER: I think it doesn't need to be charged if the clinic is stipulating to whatever liability may attach to the dentists in this verdict for whatever cause of action they might be liable for.

THE COURT: Does anybody have any --

Mr. CAHALAN: You know what, your Honor? We'll stipulate as originally requested, even with respect to the battery, and so -- but the stipulation would not extend to New FORBA. It would be limited to the clinic, the dentists as employees and even with respect to intentional tort cause of action, I don't know if the Court needs to make that charge.

THE COURT: So is everybody in agreement I don't need to charge either 2:235 or 2:237?

Mr. CAHALAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Then normally what I would do when there was an issue of vicarious liability, I might put in my charge that the parties have stipulated that a verdict against the -- or that the -- here it would be Syracuse clinic is vicariously liable for the acts of the three defendants if they find that there's liability.

1 Mr. STEVENS: Does that mean we can take the 2 Syracuse clinic off the jury verdict form? 3 Mr. HIGGINS: No. No, we have direct claims against the Syracuse clinic. 4 Mr. STEVENS: On Question Number 20, I think the 5 word "Jeremy" slipped in there alone. 6 7 Ouestion Number 20? THE COURT: Mr. LEYENDECKER: I think he's pointing out we 8 need a "Bohn" after Jeremy, Question 20. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. LEYENDECKER: And then, your Honor, on the 11 12 participation questions, we were batting around the idea 13 of whether we thought it was -- it's probably Number 3 as 14 an example, did any of the defendants personally participate, whether to identify as personally 15 16 participating would make a difference in that question, 17 whether participate was alone. 18 Mr. HIGGINS: Just trying to cure some of the 19 defendants' objections. Personally, it's the same thing. 20 It doesn't make a difference to us, but whatever. 21 Mr. FIRST: We disagree with that whole concept. 22 We think that's being incorrectly charged. 23 committed a tort or statutory violation or they didn't. 24 That's the issue. We're going to object to it at the 25 time.

Mr. HIGGINS: We made that offer, but if they're objecting to the whole charge --

THE COURT: Then we'll just leave it the way it is.

Mr. HIGGINS: Exactly.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else on the verdict sheet? All right.

So there were a couple of other things that -there were some requests to charge: There was a request
to charge habit, 1:71, with respect to the acts, acts of
the defendant dentists. The Court is not going to charge
that section. I know there was testimony by Dr. Bonds,
and I think probably all of them a little bit, about what
they would normally do. However, none of that testimony
was specific to what their pattern or practice or habit
was in '06 or '07, and so I don't think that it would be
proper to charge habit.

With respect to custom -- defendants request to charge customary practice, at 2:16 -- I think I told everybody yesterday that I was not going to charge that, but I wanted to be clear that I had decided that.

There is a request by defendants to charge error in judgment and do -- I want to hear a minute from the plaintiffs and a minute from the defendants on why I should or shouldn't do that.

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Mr. HIGGINS: Yes, Judge. In terms of the error in judgment, it requires a reasoned decision between Medicaid acceptable alternatives and, you know, and in this case, restraining the child after giving him an improper consent form and, basically, not using the last alternative, there is no -- not giving the parents another choice and not giving them a choice to go to the hospital -- in other words, there's not a choice between acceptable alternatives here, so everything is medical judgment. Everything a doctor or dentist does is medical judgment. It doesn't mean they get the medical judgment charge.

The same thing with local and no anesthesia, doing the treatment plans without getting consent with Dr. Aman doing four pulps without talking to Mrs. Varano.

These are not things that reasonable doctors would say, "Oh, well, you can either do a knee this way with three screws or two screws or one screw;" this is just -- you know, they're doing things wrong and they're not choosing between medically acceptable standard of care.

THE COURT: Mr. Stevens?

Mr. STEVENS: The suggestion four pulps and four crowns without even talking to her about it, the evidence was that Mrs. Varano testified that she was told in advance there would be four upper crowns needed, but that's a different question. My colleague here is only

going from the point of view of the plaintiff's testimony. The doctors testified that they considered alternatives and offered the parents and guardians alternatives and the alternatives were not going forward on this day, permitting us to use, for instance, protective immobilization if you want us to go forward on this day, referring them out if you don't want it done here. The doctors have testified that they do these things and make these choices and it's only plaintiff who wants to say, "Well, we don't believe them and there are no choices and no avenues," but the doctors testified very clearly they do make these choices and that is their habit.

Let me also say, when the Court said they wouldn't charge on habit because it wasn't specifically stated to the very years, all the doctors were talking about these very years, the time that they were practicing with Jeremy Bohn. That's what they were talking about, what they said to parents at that point in time. This is not an earlier or later point of time; it's exactly what they were talking about.

THE COURT: How does Dr. Bonds have a habit two weeks after he started? I mean that doesn't even make sense. You developed a habit in two weeks?

Mr. STEVENS: No, no, he'd been trained for a year in terms of how he uses the device and offers the

patient --

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THE COURT: That might be what his training was but not his habit.

Mr. STEVENS: He had already learned that by the time he started. He had been working as a dentist under supervision and chair-side for a year. He already learned his method of practice. He treated people independently for two years under what they call supervision as a resident, going out and actually doing the work. He had fully learned to be a dentist and was continuing that through, and the idea that this is not part of his habit when his testimony is that that was his habit is actually putting yourself in the point of view of the finder of fact instead of the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you. With respect to the issue of the adverse inference, I have not yet decided what I'm going to do with that. While I think that new FORBA brought an order to show cause seeking reargument of their prior motion for sanctions and upon reargument to vacate the prior order, because 22:21D(2) doesn't allow the Court to consider matters of fact that could have been included previously and weren't, and for the most part it appears that there's new evidence in the affidavit of Michele Sobotka, so I don't think the argument is appropriate.

However, I have read and am considering the papers of the co-defendants and with respect to whether or not I can give an adverse inference charge, that will not unduly prejudice those parties.

So I haven't ruled on that yet.

Mr. HIGGINS: We have no objection to the Court issuing a limiting instruction advising that the adverse inference only applies to New FORBA and not to any of the other parties.

THE COURT: That's how I have been thinking, but I'm not sure I can adequately give a limiting instruction given the nature of the claims in this lawsuit, and so that's really the dilemma. If you have a specific suggestion of language that you think would address my concern, I'm glad to hear it.

Mr. HIGGINS: Okay.

Mr. STEVENS: On the adverse inference and the failure to find performance reviews --

THE COURT: On the failure to produce the performance reviews, right.

Mr. STEVENS: My only comment is on behalf of the three dentists who didn't have control of those and who couldn't produce them one way or the other because they were not in possession but would be adversely affected by the inference that this Court is going to

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charge, so I would just ask the Court, first, do no harm, because the harm to our defendants is prejudicial.

Mr. HIGGINS: I can take a stab at that potential adverse inference since the Court raised it. Perhaps something like "you are -- you may but are not required to find that New FORBA was requested to but did not produce production reviews of certain defendant dentists and that you may find or take an adverse inference that those production reviews would have been unfavorable to New FORBA, and taking this adverse inference, I instruct you as a matter of law that the defendant dentists in this case had no control over any performance reviews and the performance reviews at issue, other than what's been produced in this case, do not pertain to those defendant dentists."

THE COURT: I lost you on the last part.

Mr. HIGGINS: I think I lost myself.

Mr. LEYENDECKER: You said "production reviews" and I think you meant to say "performance reviews."

THE COURT: I understand.

Mr. HIGGINS: I think Mr. Stevens is saying "I don't want my dentists getting blamed for not coughing up these performance reviews" and I think we could stipulate that or the Court could instruct the jury that these defendant dentists were not in control of these

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performance reviews and this adverse inference is not directed toward them.

Mr. FIRST: Judge, really that would do nothing to alleviate our concern. These performance reviews that were allegedly not produced were both Old FORBA and New FORBA performance reviews. New FORBA had them because they bought the company, and I would submit there's no way from this inference, especially where there's a claim that new FORBA utilized Old FORBA's so-called scheme, that you could tailor a charge or an inference that is limited to New FORBA. It will inherently hurt us in a way that's unfair because we're not the ones that didn't produce the performance reviews.

It's unfortunate but it's true that we are kind of bound together on this issue because they bought the company and came into possession of our records.

THE COURT: I understand that, and that's why I rethought the issue in terms of the adverse inference. What do you suggest I do as a penalty?

Mr. FIRST: If your Honor is inclined to issue a penalty, there are a lot of other options available to the court, including monetary.

THE COURT: How much would you suggest I impose?

Mr. FIRST: Do I have to answer that?

THE COURT: Yes, you do.

Mr. FIRST: I really don't know.

Mr. LEYENDECKER: I recognize it's the plaintiffs that got us down this path but I tend to come at this issue with a more practical approach and let me just make a suggestion and that suggestion would be if none of the defendants got up in closing and said, "Well, where are all the other documents that say..." you know, performance reviews, to do more procedures or where are all the other documents to say pressure... "We didn't get any of that. Why didn't you bring us 10,000 of these as opposed to..." then I would say we don't need the instruction. But if they get up and say it, then we go with something like Mr. Higgins is suggesting. So if they violate it, after they agree not to do that, then if they did, they have what they've got coming to them.

THE COURT: Not a bad suggestion. What does everybody say?

Mr. FIRST: I'm not going to agree to that.
We're not subject to the inference by definition. Why
would we agree?

Mr. HIGGINS: The reason is that that would cure the prejudice that Mr. First is now complaining about to the Court.

Mr. LEYENDECKER: And my suggestion would also cure this business of making us look like "Oh, well, you

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found a needle in a haystack" when we've got a gazillion of these and they say, "Hey, quality of care is great and that's all we care about" and that's what I want to avoid and what I'm sensing is that's what he wants to do, but he doesn't want to live with the other, and I'm not comfortable.

THE COURT: I totally understand, and frankly,
Mr. First, I'm surprised that you would point the finger
to that because I think that exactly is -- that's the
point, the reason why you get the adverse inference,
because they're not able to produce additional performance
reviews because of conduct outside of their control. So
now you're saying "I want to be able to make it look like
these guys don't have any more proof" when it's nothing
within their control.

I understand that you take the position that your client didn't do that or doesn't have them or whatever, but the Court has to try to balance the needs of all the parties in this case. I think that's a great suggestion and I guess I'll take it under advisement and we'll see what happens tomorrow with what I charge.

Mr. STEVENS: Quickly, I would like to say that our arguments are before the Court in the order to show cause --

THE COURT: That's what we're arguing right now.

Mr. CAHALAN: Could I be heard for a moment on the Court's comments? I realize that this Sobotka affidavit was new. We would have made a motion to renew but it wasn't our motion in the first place. We can't renew the plaintiff's motion. That's why we submitted the affidavit. In reality it doesn't say a whole lot more than what Linda Zoeller said during the hearing and in her own affidavit.

THE COURT: What Linda Zoeller said was totally speculative about where and what and why, and clearly Miss Zoeller and New FORBA did not take seriously my order with respect to production. You know, her testimony was she basically, from what I understand, as a paralegal was calling the shots on what to do, when to do it. And, you know, New FORBA has got to live and die with that. They give her control and she doesn't do it right, they've got to live and die with the fact that they entrusted her to take care of this job and she didn't take it seriously.

And the hearing was specifically held -- I mean, this was an issue that from the Court's perspective, Miss Sobotka could have come and testified. While I said that Linda Zoeller had to testify, I didn't say that you were excluded from bringing anybody else here, and I mean Miss Zoeller, her testimony was very speculative about what could have happened, should have happened, et cetera.

So I hear what you're saying, Mr. Cahalan, but I think I'm going to be prepared to charge the adverse inference charge in some form or another tomorrow.

However, I will not charge it if -- I think it's only appropriate, if one of the defendants is suggesting that the plaintiffs pulled out one when they should have had more, that I'm going to charge adverse inference.

Mr. CAHALAN: Your Honor, could I just ask a question for clarification on the likely charge that will be made? For the purposes of Mr. Hulslander, and I think the others, understanding what the boundaries are, my understanding is there is a performance review that was disclosed for Dr. Aman a few months before treatment of Jeremy Bohn and that has whatever content it has, says whatever it says and to the extent that it's in evidence, we should be able to discuss it, maybe not in terms of that's the only one and why aren't there more, why they didn't come out with more, but discussing what that says.

Mr. LEYENDECKER: No question 46 is fair game. The point is you can't come in and say "Aha! Where are all the others?" Or something along these lines.

Mr. CAHALAN: But talking about performance reviews, but there's all kinds of evidence that they presented -- reports, e-mails and such -- that aren't performance reviews and I think part of the defense's

argument might be, "Where are all the e-mails?" It's not limited to just performance reviews.

THE COURT: You kind of already did argue that.

In one of the witnesses, you brought that subject up, you know, "Where are all these..." But frankly, plaintiff asked, "Yeah, where are the other ones that show you were looking at the merits of the work of the dentists" or something like that. It's your call, what you're going to do, but obviously you can --

Mr. CAHALAN: I don't want to --

THE COURT: He's just talking about performance reviews. That's the only subject that the adverse inference goes to.

Mr. LEYENDECKER: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Defendants were requesting 1:64 with respect to clear and convincing, the clear and convincing standard. What was that for?

Mr. STEVENS: For the allegations of G.B.L. 349; is that correct? Yes -- 349. Since the tenor of 349, the way it's being used in this case, is for fraud, the way fraud is defined in terms of burden of proof is clear and convincing.

THE COURT: I hear what you're saying. Then
2:275, comparative fault. You guys are asking for that.
Is there any dispute on that? Both sides were asking for

1	that charge, or put it in their proposed charges.				
2	Mr. HIGGINS: Judge, that's the general				
3	allocation charge, comparative fault.				
4	THE COURT: Right.				
5	Mr. HIGGINS: We don't have any objection to the				
6	comparative fault.				
7	THE COURT: Okay. Plaintiffs were requesting				
8	2:10A, gross negligence charge.				
9	Mr. LEYENDECKER: I think it's the end of the				
LO	day and that fell out of our details and that can come				
L1	off, your Honor.				
L2	THE COURT: 2:235 we talked about that already,				
L3	and 2:237.				
L4	Okay. I think those were the only disputed				
L5	charges between the parties, so				
L6	Mr. FRANKEL: May I be heard on one point?				
L7	THE COURT: Yes.				
L8	Mr. FRANKEL: They had offered under 3.20.1 an				
L9	instruction on opinion versus fact. This is fraud				
20	response to the consent defense of battery claim, and so				
21	they I think that's on their list. I know we talked				
22	about it last night.				
23	THE COURT: 3.20.1, intentional torts, fact				
24	versus opinion, right.				
25	Mr. FRANKEL: And initially I thought that the				

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instruction needed additional language because it was legally too narrow. I looked at it last night, and this morning, my conclusion is that it doesn't apply to this case. And if you look at the instruction itself in the Pattern, it uses the term "under these circumstances."

THE COURT: I've got the Pattern right here.

Mr. FRANKEL: Okay. It's a general statement, the law under normal circumstances, opinion can't be the basis for a fraud claim. But the circumstances that we have and that are described in the comments in the Pattern are circumstances where the law does permit opinion to be the basis for a fraud claim, and there are two specific reasons.

One is a circumstance where the defendant has special knowledge or skill and knows that the plaintiff does not and is relying on defendant's opinion as an expert. That's a circumstance where the law does allow opinion to be the basis for a fraud claim.

The other is where the defendant stands in the position of trust with the plaintiff. That's another exception that's specifically discussed right there in the Pattern comments on Page 170 and 171.

Those are the circumstances that are really undisputed in this case. No question Ms. Varano was relying upon an expert, a professional's opinion as to

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what the risks were of restraints and that Dr. Bonds knew he was dealing with somebody who would be relying on his opinion. Likewise, he was in a position of trust.

Those circumstances under New York law are circumstances in which opinion can be the basis for a fraud claim, and so the standard instruction, which is the one they're asking for, would be in this statement of law under these circumstances. To say that under these circumstances, opinion — that you find if it's an opinion then stop; it can't be fraud, which is the instruction they have asked for, just ignores the actual circumstances we're dealing with and would be a misstatement of New York law.

THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. STEVENS: This is like an Alice in
Wonderland argument from someone who is not asking for
charge 28:05 because if the issue is whether informed
consent was properly given, then 28:05 is what that's all
about. They have this crazy conflict, "Oh you can have
informed consent," but "if it's by fraud, then it's not
informed consent." Of course it's not. Informed consent
means proper informed consent, telling someone the
benefits and risks and that's what fits in this case and
what they're trying to keep out of this case and that's
what should be a predicate to any claim of battery and

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that's what is missing and that's what should be question number one, it should be malpractice and then lack of informed consent and those should be the predicate questions. In turning this around the way it is in these jury questions, gives -- in my view -- a confusing view to the jury of what's happening here. I disagree with my colleague about what he said with respect to that charge, and it all makes even less sense in the absence of 28:05.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Were there any limiting instructions? During the course of the trial, during the course of the motions in limine, the Court had talked about giving various limiting instructions. We revisited that subject yesterday, and the only limiting instruction that I understood from our meeting yesterday that the parties are asking me to give relates to the guidelines and that the -- that essentially that the guidelines aren't standard of care.

Was there another -- anything else with respect to limiting instructions?

Mr. HIGGINS: Judge, I'm not sure it was a limiting instruction. We did discuss this yesterday, but the modified charge as to Jeremy's parents' condition, which is Exhibit A, Page 3, of our charges. If you find Jeremy is entitled to recover under the rules of law given you, the sum you award as damages cannot be reduced by

2.0

anything that Jeremy's parents either did or did not do as to Jeremy or his care. I further instruct you that there is no claim in this case that either Jeremy or his parents were negligent. I don't know if that's a limiting instruction or a charge, but --

THE COURT: I was looking at it as a charge.

That was in -- that's in your proposed charges.

Mr. HIGGINS: Yes, it is.

Mr. STEVENS: In terms of simplifying, your

Honor, on the reckless disregard for the safety of others,
first, we believe that Drs. Aman, Bond and Khan shouldn't
be named in the punitive damage section and we object to
them being there, but if the Court disagrees and they are
named, then we don't need the Article 16 reckless
disregard section because if there's a finding that
they've acted under the punitive damage charge section,
then that more than applies, but assumes the reckless
disregard. So that would be two ways of finding out the
same thing.

THE COURT: So you're suggesting that the

Article 16 limitation is synonymous with the standard, is
the same as the punitive damages?

Mr. STEVENS: Maybe even more so. In other words, if there's a finding that any party is liable for punitive damages, I think the Court as a matter of law can

say they used reckless disregard for the safety of others.

I think that's a very easy thing --

THE COURT: But is the reverse true?

Mr. STEVENS: I don't think the reverse needs to be true.

THE COURT: I think some people were arguing that we need to have a determination as to the damages with respect to each of the individual defendants so that we can look at whether Article 16 applies for non-economic loss.

Mr. STEVENS: I would be happy enough if the Article 16 language were left in and the three individual dentists were not named in the punitive damage section and I urge that they shouldn't be and we object to them being named in that section. But if all the parties are going to be named in that section, then I think the reckless disregard question under Article 16 becomes a surplus issue.

Mr. HIGGINS: And I respectfully disagree,

Judge, with Mr. Stevens. I understand the argument, but

under 16.02(5), I believe, it's a different -- it can be a

different standard so, you know, the punitive damages can

be held for something more than negligence and something

less than intentional conduct, gross negligence, things of

that nature. That's all in the P.J.I.

1 So the fact that they get punitive damages is 2 not going to answer the question under 16.02(5), I believe, or 7. So that's why it's in there. We think it 3 should respectfully stand. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. LEYENDECKER: One little typo, I think, on 6 7 Page 20, your Honor, in your instruction there at the bottom, you've got 13-C. Thirteen is the battery question 8 9 and you've just got an A and B on the battery, so I think 10 there's no 13-C. 11 THE COURT: Okay. That's because there was a C 12 until I took it out. 13 Mr. CAHALAN: Your Honor, you mentioned earlier if there were any other questions regarding the 14 modification charges. Are we doing that now or are we 15 16 doing that tomorrow after closings because I do have some submissions with some of the modified charges that they 17 18 proposed. 19 I got something from Danielle, I THE COURT: 20 think. Do you have something that's different from what she sent me? 21 22 Mr. CAHALAN: Two items in the --23 THE COURT: You --

Mr. CAHALAN: -- per se charge. They had a

definition of what an owner is, a short, one-sentence

24

25

1	item, and I don't think it correctly states the law of						
2	what an owner would be. The owners of the clinics were						
3	licensed dentists and owners pursuant to a contract. They						
4	were owners of the clinic.						
5	THE COURT: Do you have something you're						
6	submitting in writing?						
7	Mr. CAHALAN: I can.						
8	Mr. FIRST: We agree with that and we did cover						
9	that.						
10	THE COURT: Why don't you look at what Danielle						
11	sent me already, and if you need to send me something						
12	else, the sooner you send it, the better. More chance						
13	I'll read it.						
14	Anything else?						
15	Okay. See everybody tomorrow.						
16	Mr. FIRST: One more thing. We've reserved						
17	motions both after the plaintiffs case and obviously after						
18	the defendant's case. When do you want to hear those?						
19	THE COURT: When do I want to hear them?						
20	Mr. FIRST: That's the wrong question. When						
21	will you hear them?						
22	THE COURT: How long are you going to be?						
23	Mr. FIRST: Not long. I'm personally not going						
24	to be long.						
25	THE COURT: If you guys want to come at 8:30 and						

1	we'll do it. The jury is coming at quarter of.
2	Mr. FIRST: It's just something we need to do.
3	Mr. STEVENS: They asked for a directed verdict.
4	The defendants don't get a chance
5	Mr. LEYENDECKER: Nobody is saying you waive
6	your right if it doesn't happen by 4:30 today or 8:30
7	THE COURT: I have said all along everybody's
8	rights are reserved with respect to any motions because I
9	have always taken the view that the jurors are more
LO	important than anybody else. Your rights are reserved.
L1	We can put those on tomorrow morning if everyone is here
L2	to put them on at 8:30, but I'm only giving you until
L3	quarter of nine to do it, so be succinct.
L4	Mr. FIRST: Thank you.
L5	THE COURT: Thank you.
L6	(Conclusion of proceedings).
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2	CERTIFICATE					
3						
4	I, VALERIE WAITE, an Official Court Reporter					
5	in and for the State of New York, Fifth Judicial District,					
6	do hereby certify that I recorded stenographically the					
7	foregoing proceedings, at the time and place noted in the					
8	heading hereof, and that it is a true and correct					
9	transcript of the proceedings therein to the best of my					
10	ability.					
11						
12						
13	Valerie Waite, Senior Court Reporter					
14	Dated: October 7, 2013					
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